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Abstract: 
The debate over what counts as theory has dominated methodological 
conversations in grounded theory research for decades. Four of the schools 
of thought in that debate—Glaserian, Straussian, Charmazian, and 
Clarkeian—hold different assumptions about what theory is and how it is 
made. The first two schools understand theory as an abstraction that 
exactingly accounts for exceptions. The second two schools understand 
theory as a process of describing voices hidden from public view. While 
Glaserian and Straussian coding processes focus on coding exceptions, 
Charmazian and Clarkeian coding processes focus on building a story of the 
participants or social phenomenon. This paper attempts to clarify the goals 
of the schools in an effort to overcome the debate about which kinds of 




















































































The debate over what counts as theory has dominated methodological conversations in 
grounded theory research for decades. Four of the schools of thought in that debate—Glaserian, 
Straussian, Charmazian, and Clarkeian—hold different assumptions about what theory is and 
how it is made. The first two schools understand theory as an abstraction that exactingly 
accounts for exceptions. The second two schools understand theory as a process of describing 
voices hidden from public view. While Glaserian and Straussian coding processes focus on 
coding exceptions, Charmazian and Clarkeian coding processes focus on building a story of the 
participants or social phenomenon. This paper attempts to clarify the goals of the schools in an 
effort to overcome the debate about which kinds of research count as grounded theory and which 
do not.




































































But is that really grounded theory? 
Grounded theory has become one of the cornerstones of qualitative research in the social 
sciences. And, as with any important cultural artifact, it continues to attract fervent debate. 
Interestingly, though, these debates have largely forgotten the critical question, what is grounded 
theory supposed to do? This lack of attention-to-purpose has trapped grounded theory’s methodological 
debates around what ‘counts’ as grounded theory research: Can a researcher pursue formal theory as 
part of a constructivist research approach? Can the coding tools of early grounded theory researchers be 
used to do social justice research? Our close reading uses two linked arguments to initiate 
conversations that work to release this trapped debate. 
The first argument addresses the notion of theory in four ‘schools’ of thought on grounded 
theory: Glaserian, Straussian, Charmazian, and Clarkeian. While many scholars have taken up and 
elaborated grounded theory methodology, we suggest that these authors have generated four unique 
methodological systems under which other contributions to the field can be considered (Allen, 2010).  
Indeed, the claim that there are different approaches to conducting grounded theory research is not new 
(Heath & Cowley, 2004; Morse, 2009; Stern, 1980). It became clear in the early 1990s that consensus 
about grounded theory was unlikely when its founders launched a caustic debate (Melia, 1996). Debate 
continues today around what it means to do theoretical research grounded in data (Bryant, 2007). Yet, 
what ‘a theory’ is, how a reader interacts with it, and what its purpose is, has escaped close analysis. 
Our first argument will focus on problematizing how grounded theorists understand what counts as 
grounded theory.   
The second argument focuses on two methodological aspects of grounded theory. The first 
aspect considers the role of description in grounded theory. Early grounded theorists defined 
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themselves against ethnographers (Crotty, 1998) whom, they claimed, produced ‘researched 
description’ instead of ‘sociological theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Debate continues today around 
where description ends and theory begins in grounded theory research (Greckhamer & Koro‐
Ljungberg, 2005). The second aspect regards accounting for exceptions to a theory within that theory.  
Ultimately, our second argument will focus on linking choices grounded theorists make during the 
research process that push the research product toward ‘description’ or toward ‘theory.’ Our goal is to 
analyze how conversations about methodological approaches such as coding may overemphasize 
differences between the schools and obscure core epistemological similarities. If grounded theory 
across all four schools is a methodology for analysing social processes based on the precepts of 
symbolic interactionism and pragmatism (Aldiabat & Navenec, 2011; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987), 
then what fundamentally differentiates between the four schools is not the epistemology of the school 
itself but rather the position assumed by the researcher for answering specific questions at a specific 
time and place (de Gialdino, 2009). For Urquhart (2013), grounded theory “is orthogonal not only to 
the type of data used but can also be appropriated by researchers with different assumptions about 
knowledge and how it can be obtained” (pp. 36). Making this shift in accountability to researchers 
instead of schools calls into question previous assertions that good grounded theory research sticks 
purely to using methods from one of the four schools (Chen & Boore, 2009).  
Our analysis attempts to clarify exactly how the tools of coding are used in each of the four 
schools. We hope doing that work helps researchers attempting to dip into each of the four schools. The 
walls of the schools were erected by the epistemological boundaries of the time and social context in 
which each of these authors were writing. Better understanding how they differ may help qualitative 
social scientists to perform symbolic interactionist research that transgresses traditional boundaries of 
the grounded theory schools, boundaries which may be more permeable than once thought.  
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FOUR SCHOOLS OF THEORY ON GROUNDED THEORY 
Each of the originators of the four schools use the word theory differently. In the original 
conception, a research product is a grounded theory simply if it “explains or predicts something” 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, pp. 31). The simplicity of that definition falls away when the question is 
extended to ask what it means to explain or predict, what form the explanation or prediction takes, or 
how a reader should interact with it. For Glaser a grounded theory is abstract, for Strauss it captures 
complexity, for Charmaz it is about theorizing an argument about the world, and for Clarke it is about 
theorizing comparisons. The stark division between theory as a noun in the first two cases and 
theorizing as a verb in the second two is deliberate and grounded in the literature. This delineation 
made by Charmaz and Clarke is just one example of the lack of consensus over what theory is. The 
citations in Table 1 introduce this basic premise of difference. 
We have deliberately chosen to use the term ‘schools’ as a means of comparison. For some, 
there are two ‘versions’ (Denzin, 2007; Urquhart, 2013), ‘strands’ (Urquhart, 2013), ‘approaches’ 
(Heath & Cowley, 2004), or ‘models’ (Melia, 1996) of grounded theory, that of Strauss and that of 
Glaser. We have chosen to not use those terms to avoid the notion that there are only two schools of 
grounded theory. Following partially in the footsteps of Morse (2009), we have also chosen to opt out 
of using proprietary names given to the schools by their founders themselves. ‘Formal,’ ‘traditional,’ 
and ‘classic’ are adjectives used by Glaser to distinguish Glaserian grounded theory from other 
approaches (Glaser, 2007). Charmaz uses ‘constructivist’ to distinguish Charmazian grounded theory 
(Charmaz, 2014). And Clarke uses ‘situational analysis’ to distinguish Clarkeian grounded theory 
(Clarke, 2005). We have instead used the names of the schools’ founders because it allows us to 
actively demonstrate that the four schools are stances assumed by persons writing into specific 
historical and cultural contexts and are not permanent boundaries. 
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“In the case of qualitative data, the explicit goal is description. The clear issue articulated 
in much of the literature regarding qualitative data analysis methodology is the accuracy, 
truth, trustworthiness or objectivity of the data [while] [t]he conceptual nature of classic 
GT renders it abstract of time, place, and people.” (pp. 1-2) 
Strauss 
(1987) 
Grounded theory “is designed especially for generating and testing theory” (pp. xi, 
emphasis in original) and privileging “higher-level” (pp. 242) formal theories which 
“capture a great deal of the variation” (pp. 8) that characterize social phenomena such  as 
socialization rather than substantive theories pertaining to an “empirical area of enquiry 
such as…professional education.” (pp. 242) 
Charmaz 
(2006) 
“Theories present arguments about the world and the relationships within it…My 
preference for theorizing—and it is for theorizing not for theory—is unabashedly 
interpretive. Theorizing is a practice…The fundamental contribution of grounded theory 
methods resides in offering a guide to interpretive theoretical practice not in providing a 
blueprint for theoretical products.” (pp.128. emphasis in original) 
Clarke 
(2005) 
“[A] strategy for pulling grounded theory around the postmodern turn is asserting the 
analytic sufficiency of sensitizing concepts, analytics, and theorizing for solid grounded 
theory research. This replaces the pursuit of substantive or formal theory advocated in 
traditional grounded theory…More modest and partial but serious, useful and hopefully 
provocative… The possibility of analytic extension of theorizing… is accomplished 
through the use of comparisons rather than theoretical formalization and claims of 
transcendence.” (pp. 28-29, emphasis in original) 
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We have chosen to focus on the technical details of the schools in asking ‘how do each of these 
authors present their case for theory’? We wish to acknowledge, however, that the stances of these 
authors are rhetorical ones. We think of the seminal writing in the schools as performances of 
epistemology for specific audiences at a culturally-bound time and place. We welcome researchers to 
find connections between their own work and more than one of these now clearly distinguishable 
performances.  
Once we have laid out the idea of theory in each of the schools, this paper will move on to 
provide empirical examples of the coding tools used by each and their subsequent scholarly products. 
We have threaded examples of empirical work from each school throughout the paper.
*
 For examples 
of Glaser’s and Strauss’s approaches we have used the thought experiment of the maître d’hôtel 
discussed by Glaser in Emergence vs Forcing (1992) and by Strauss & Corbin in Basics of Qualitative 
Research (1990). For examples of Charmaz’s approach we have included her work from Good Days, 
Bad Days (1991) and drawn comparisons against earlier empirical grounded theory work, Time for 
Dying (Glaser & Strauss, 1968). For examples of Clarke’s work we have drawn from her 
methodological and empirical paper “A Social Worlds Research Adventure: The Case of Reproductive 
Science” (1997). These examples efficiently demonstrate how the authors thought their methodological 
suggestions might be made manifest. While this first section focuses on how the authors make their 
cases for what constitutes theory, the examples in later sections of the paper illustrate and ground this 
discussion in how methodological approaches shape the research product. 
It is our hope that researchers might use these tools to approach Adele Clarke’s (2005) notion 
that, from its earliest days, grounded theory was “always already” postmodern (p. 19). Using this 
                                                 
*
 That said, we have not included a full evolutionary taxonomy of grounded theory emanating from each school, as that 
work has been tackled adequately elsewhere (Allen, 2010; Heath & Cowley, 2004; Morse, 2009; Urquhart, 2013). Instead, 
what follows is an exhaustive exploration of how each author writes about their approach to theory and how to make it.  
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analysis to take up and blend the tools of each school may help researchers to communicate effectively 
about grounded theory methodology rather than considering each school purely as mutually exclusive 
theory-methods packages. 
Glaserian Theory 
Theory, according to Glaser, is not expressly descriptive. It is not “empirical description” 
(Glaser, 1992, pp. 14), “voluminous description” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 92), or “immaculate description” 
(Glaser, 1978, pp. 3). Situated descriptions of substantive areas, he argues do not “build and contribute 
on more general levels of the scientific enterprise, such as to a theory of becoming…[instead] pure 
description is situation specific” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 15). For Glaser, the purpose of theory is to do what 
description cannot do: transcend person, place, and time. It is, in short, to produce what sociologists 
call ‘formal theory.’ Formal theory is “theory developed for a formal or conceptual area of sociological 
inquiry” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 144). This oft-repeated definition circularly uses the term ‘formal’ in both 
the term and its explication. Attending to examples of formal theory provides more clarity:  
“We defined substantive theory as theory about a substantive area of inquiry—such as pain 
management, science careers, patient care and professional education. It is theory that fits the 
substantive area’s main problems and works in predicting outcomes in the area…In contrast, a 
formal theory is a theory developed or discovered for a conceptual area of inquiry—such as status 
passage, social stratification, formal organization, or stigma.” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 99) 
Glaser pursues sociological theory at its highest levels of abstraction. The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory (1967) was Glaser’s effort to write a manual for how to create theories that persist at the highest 
levels of academia and popular culture. “Good ideas are one good test of the theory. They last, people 
cannot resist using them. They cannot forget them: for example who can forget ‘looking glass self,’ 
‘generalized other,’ and ‘anticipatory socialization’…Good ideas contribute the most to the science of 
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sociology. Findings are soon forgotten, but not ideas” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 8). Some suggest grounded 
theory’s legacy is its failure to create ideas at the level of abstraction it purports to seek (Timmermans 
& Tavory, 2012). Nevertheless, Glaser’s conception of the purpose of theory remains creating ideas at 
this level of abstraction. A grounded theorist’s work is to continually “transcend preceding theories” by 
“integrat[ing] them into a broader theory” with a “process of greater scope and higher conceptual level” 
(Glaser, 1978, pp. 15). His mission—and, he implies, the mission of the social sciences in general—
should be to create, brick-by-brick, a complete structural representation of human interaction.  
Grounded theory, Glaser writes, “provides a bridge to seeing the same problems and processes 
in other areas” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 15). While the work of grounded theory may be specific—
“generating concepts and their relationships that explain, account for and interpret the variation in 
behavior in substantive areas under study” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 19)—its true purpose is general. The 
yield of a grounded theory is “just hypotheses!” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 16, emphasis in original) about how 
people in a situation behave to process problems they encounter. But those hypotheses should be 
general and abstract enough to transcend the context in which they were discovered. They should, 
therefore, represent permanent characteristics of human social behaviour and thinking.  
Straussian Theory 
For Strauss, the complexity of a theory trumps its level of abstraction. Strauss introduced the 
term complexity to the methodological literature on grounded theory in 1987 (Strauss, 1987). While it 
may seem innocuous, introducing the term altered how Strauss, and those who followed him, 
represented the purpose of theory-making. Complexity has become a term used by philosophers of 
science as a shorthand for the impossibility of discovering linear cause and effect relationships, for a 
constitutive “unpredictability and unreliability that doesn’t yield to human understanding” (Mitchell, 
2009, pp. 11). Strauss wrote as if the purpose of grounded theory must be reconfigured because social 
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phenomena are so complex that generating single explanatory concepts that transcends all context is 
impossible.  For Strauss, this “is, of course, an old problem: abstraction (theory) inevitably simplifies, 
yet to comprehend deeply, to order, some degree of abstraction is necessary. How to keep a balance 
between distortion and conceptualization?” he asked (Strauss, 1993, pp. 12, brackets in original). 
Strauss tried to fill the methodological gap of his contemporaries, “researchers working in various 
research traditions [who] describe or analyse the phenomena they study in relatively uncomplex terms, 
having given up on the possibility of ordering the ‘buzzing, blooming confusion’ of experience except 
for ignoring ‘for a time’ its complexity. Their assumption apparently [being] that later generations will 
build on their current endeavors” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 6-7). Both he and Glaser based their 
methodological approaches on the assumption that approaching the social using grounded theory tries 
to “fit the realities under study in the eyes of their subject, practitioners and researchers in the area” 
(Glaser, 1992, pp. 14, emphasis added) and that “analysis is synonymous with interpretation of data” 
(Strauss, 1987, pp. 4, emphasis in original). But where Glaser held up a postwar push toward reductive 
and predictive sociology, Strauss flirted with a new era of social scientists who purposively 
acknowledged the constructed nature of both perception and research.  
Strauss’s emphasis on complexity coaxed the definition of theory toward broader interpretations 
in the work of others. Rather than focusing purely on formal theory, Strauss wrote that “depending on 
the purposes of the investigator, the final conclusions drawn in the course of the research can vary 
greatly by level of abstraction” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 4). While Glaser considers this kind of research to 
be a-theoretical, low level “narrative description…[of] a central phenomenon around which all other 
categories are integrated” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 76), Strauss explicitly proposes that description can be 
“complex, systematic, and interpretive” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 4), and even that “theory can be 
descriptive” (ibid, pp. 4). Strauss primarily values, then, the pursuit of “effective…[and] conceptually 
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dense” theory (Strauss, 1987, pp. 1) that meets the intended ends of the researchers creating it. Rather 
than insisting that only formal theory counts as theory, Strauss’s conceptualization of theory allows for 
a kind of analytic description that generations of grounded theorists have come to rely on.  
Charmazian Theory 
Charmaz takes a new position on the role of abstraction and description in theory by redefining 
how a grounded theory accounts for exceptions. She orients her theory-producing efforts away from 
Strauss’s desire to create dense theory and Glaser’s insistence on formally abstracted theory. For 
Charmaz, “early grounded theory works stress discovering and analyzing a basic social process” 
(Charmaz, 2006, pp. 173, emphasis in original). She partially sidesteps the issue of Glaser and Strauss’s 
creating what amount to universal norms of interaction by declining to microscopically account for the 
exceptions to her theoretical frameworks. For both Glaser and Strauss, a significant amount of 
fieldwork is devoted to the theorist finding the exceptions to any category of behaviour they’ve created 
(Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987). Exceptions to or variations of the category are brought into the emerging 
theory as properties (Glaser, 1978) or dimensions (Strauss, 1987). In their manuscripts, paragraph after 
paragraph are devoted to addressing each exception and explaining what social processes precipitate 
the exception (Glaser & Strauss, 1968, 1971; Strauss, Fagerhaugh, Suczek et al., 1985).  
Charmaz’s version of theory works differently. Charmaz transfers the burden of rigor from 
exacting explications of exceptions to authentic representations of the words, actions, and stories—the 
marginalized voices—of her participants (Charmaz, 2008). Grounded theory can be used to “reveal 
links between concrete experiences of suffering and social structure, culture, and social practices or 
policies” (Charmaz, 2011, pp. 362). Theory, for Charmaz, is more salient when conceived as the active 
process of theorizing, of making an “argument” about the world (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 128). Glaser 
interprets Charmaz’s turn toward describing and reorganizing the viewpoints of her participants as an 
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obsession with accuracy that misunderstands the irrelevance of accuracy to grounded theory (Glaser, 
2002). To Charmaz, however, the product carries with it a more pronounced sense of action, of the 
participants speaking through the researcher to the reader (Charmaz, 2006). Here, a theory becomes 
less minutely preoccupied with justifying to the reader how an abstract process applies to all people at 
all times minus some exceptions. Instead, the purpose of the theory is to fracture and re-organize the 
“strands of the stor(ies)” (Charmaz, 1991, pp. 7) of participants and give the reader the sense that the 
categories constructed by the researcher would be meaningful to the participants themselves.  
Charmaz’s Good Days, Bad Days (Charmaz, 1991) serves as a microcosm of this subtle but 
important change. The first two sections of Days resembles the constructivist grounded theory 
methodological approach that Charmaz later coined (Charmaz, 2003, 2006) while the third section, 
written 18 years earlier, more identifiably resembles the empirical work of her doctoral supervisors 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1968). In the first two sections, the categories are named using gerunds, participants 
are quoted more liberally and more often than in Glaser and Strauss’s work, and the voices of the 
researcher and participants are blended thoroughly. In contrast, the third section focuses on a single 
basic social process, “living one day at a time” (Charmaz, 1991, pp. 178). It lists and explains the 
properties of the categories, “temporal incongruence” (ibid, pp. 171) and “illness as timemarker” (ibid, 
pp. 198) for example, and, most importantly, it takes account of exceptions in the form of 
“contrast(ing)” cases (ibid. pp. 177). When taking up the methodology in her own right years later, 
Charmaz contrasts the abstractions of “explicit theory” with more “useful analytical frameworks” 
(Charmaz, 2014, pp. xv) that free up room for descriptive ethnographic, narrative, and biographical 
work by not prioritizing exceptions to her telling. 




































































Adele Clarke studied under Anselm Strauss at UCSF along with Kathy Charmaz. When he 
retired, Clarke inherited his university appointment and extended his methodological concerns (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1997). Clarke used Strauss’s marginal inclusion of social worlds/arena as a tool to extend 
Charmaz’s minimization of the importance of exceptions. The social worlds/arenas theory posits that 
differences of interpretation are the most basic aspect of social processes, not abstract similarities 
(Clarke, 1997).  
Like Charmaz, Clarke minimizes accounting for exceptions in the production of theory. Strauss, 
for decades, held that the grounded theory method would lead two researchers to develop the same 
theory if they observed exactly the same events during the data collection process (Strauss, 1994). 
There were, however, hints that he believed categories to be “created” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 17) and, 
later, that “theory does not just ‘emerge’ from data; rather data is itself constructed…and interpreted” 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1997, pp. 64). Strauss did not engage at length with this new perception of the role 
of theory, and he persisted in developing theoretical works that presented a single social process 
regardless of context. But he did begin to use a theoretical lens that indicated a growing concern, not 
with identifying and controlling isolated exceptions to a theory but rather one that takes exceptions and 
difference to be the guiding principle of the methodological process. In 1987, Strauss started to use the 
social worlds/arenas theory, and Clarke later put the theory at the core of her methodology (Clarke, 
1997, 2005). Depicting social world/arenas as an inherent tool for theory-making means that 
constructing theory is no longer about drawing a single process across multiple contexts. Instead, by 
describing the interpretations of objects, processes, situations, and the social commitments that people 
have to them, social worlds/arenas-focused theory production makes the assumption of difference and 
exception the core principle upon which a theory is built (Clarke, 1990).  
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Clarke selects the notion of description out of Strauss’s work. While “Strauss [only] nodded to 
the ever-widening path… [toward grounded theorists becoming] scientific describers” (Kearney, 2007, 
pp. 133), Clarke strode fully down it. For Clarke, the purpose of theory is to “draw attention to certain 
aspects of social life…[and] to particular actors and their activities” (Clarke, 1997, pp. 84-85). She uses 
the description of difference as a fundamental principle for her theory building process.  
Clarke asserts that the core activity of a social world shifts over time and can be read and 
experienced differently. In her paper “The Case of Reproductive Science” (Clarke, 1997), Clarke pivots 
an analysis of the ‘core activity’ in a social world around the differences that she herself experienced 
during the research process. For example, the core activity—the foundational means of establishing 
legitimacy—in the reproductive sciences before WWII shifted from linking one’s work with animal 
research to linking it with endocrinology (Clarke, 1997). The social process of establishing legitimacy 
emerges from Clarke’s study as a product of grounded theory analysis, but, most importantly, that 
notion of a single process sits in the background of her work. Instead, she emphasizes the people who 
do the work, where they come from, how they speak and write about themselves, and how she 
experienced them as a researcher.  
Clarke embeds efforts to expand Strauss’s concern with “reveal[ing] types of work not 
previously viewed as work per se, hidden work…and the negotiation of the actual division of labor 
(rather than, for example, professional claims-making about it)” (Clarke, 1997, pp. 72, brackets in 
original) directly into her methodological premise. By forcing theory-building to “keep track over time 
not only of what is being done in a line of work but also what isn’t” (Clarke, 1997, pp. 85), Clarke 
orients the theory building process toward identifying silenced aspects of work.  Clarke’s descriptions 
of social situations intentionally endeavor to describe things, people, and kinds of work that are not 
commonly acknowledged. 




































































We have attempted to describe the changing nature of theory in grounded theory. The 
methodological edicts of early grounded theory must be considered not as permanent rules about the 
nature of grounded theory research but rather epistemological performances for a specific time and 
place that have subsequently shaped the perception of their analytic tools. What started with a single 
explanatory concept has become a complex and dense descriptive framework. This shift has significant 
implications for what kind of data grounded theorists collect and how it is analyzed.  
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The codes a researcher applies to the data shape what data is collected and how it is collected. 
For Saldana, coding is the “‘critical link’ between data collection and their explanation of meaning” 
(Saldaña, 2012, pp. 3). The more value a grounded theory school places on description in its product, 
the less it places on detailed accounting for exceptions in its coding process. For example, in the 
original conception of grounded theory, coding is designed to record “the full range of types or 
continua of the categories, its dimensions, the conditions under which it is pronounced or minimized, 
its major consequences, its relation to other categories, and its other properties” (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967, pp. 106). Using a coding strategy capable of capturing this elaborate series of variables requires a 
similarly elaborate system of data collection.  
The coding strategy therefore shapes the product of the research toward description or toward 
abstract theory. The coding, in a way, fences in the analysis. Though it is rarely acknowledged in the 
methodological literature, grounded theorists from across the four schools code differently (Urquhart, 
2013). The most explicit delineation of which codes are which comes from Glaser’s (1978) ‘coding 
families.’ Glaser distinguishes between process codes (ex. stages, phases), strategy codes (ex. tactics, 
manouverings), causal codes (ex. amplifying loops), and descriptive codes (Glaser, 1978, 1992; 
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Urquhart, 2013). Grounded theorists across the four schools favor some of these families over others 
because they require different material to build the different kinds of theories they aspire to.  
Glaserian Coding 
Glaserian grounded theory strives for parsimony in the coding of data and creation of 
categories. A grounded theorist of other schools may code aspects in a single incident of a maître 
d’hôtel’s work flow as ‘watching,’ ‘information passing,’ ‘attentiveness,’ ‘unintrusiveness,’ 
‘monitoring quality,’ ‘providing assistance,’ ‘information gathering,’ and many others (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1990). For Glaserian grounded theory, a more tentative coding and memoing process repeats as 
the researcher returns to the data collection. Multiple attempts are made at creating a single category 
that sticks, that has grab, and that can be used to explain the observed behavior while keeping a close 
eye on exceptions to the category (Glaser, 1992). Glaser’s version of the iterative process relies on the 
presumption of what he calls emergence. Emergence is the notion that enough iterations of comparison 
can lead to the construction of a core category that is broadly explanatory and under which almost all 
observed behaviors and reports fall (Glaser, 1978). For Glaser, “labeling each incident” within an 
incident (Glaser, 1992, pp. 42) leads to burdensome analysis. Glaserian coding is, instead, “halfway 
between labeling each incident and conceptualizing many incidents” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 42). For 
example, according to Glaser, the maître d’hôtel may simply have been ‘cultivating relationships’ with 
staff or clients (Glaser, 1992). 
Glaser’s approach to coding is the most multifaceted of the four schools despite his affinity for 
parsimony. In Theoretical Sensitivity, Glaser presents 18 coding families (Glaser, 1978). In 2005, he 
suggested 23 more (Urquhart, 2013). Glaser’s coding families cover vast swaths of social interaction 
and the factors that influence it. He suggests that one or more of the coding families may “naturally 
emerge [during the research process] when it is relevant to the substantive area under study” (Glaser, 
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1992, pp. 91, emphasis in original). But he also, and perhaps more importantly in our contemporary 
postmodern context, suggests that each of these coding families will call out to different researchers 
depending on their ‘disciplinary perspectives’ and personal interests (Glaser, 1992). 
Glaser’s flexibility in coding families has downstream methodological implications for the 
identification of exceptions. Glaserian grounded theory research collects data through field 
observations and “passive non structured interviewing or listening” (Glaser, 2002, pp. 3). “Events 
and…happenings” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 2) are observed, concepts are created to describe them, concepts 
are turned into categories by comparing the observed concepts with other concepts. Categories are 
discovered through “preconscious processing” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 18) that identifies when concepts are 
comparable; that is, when they involve behaviors or reports in interviews that appear to be similar to 
the researcher. When new concepts are encountered and fall within an existing category their 
exceptions and their granular differences with other concepts in the category are recorded as properties 
(Glaser, 1978). Properties thus describe the way in which concepts are different but related. In short, 
Glaserian properties are built for tracking exceptions to concepts as the theory emerges. This elaborate 
mode of accounting for exceptions well serves Glaser’s purpose of developing formal theory.  
Straussian Coding 
Strauss is interested in exceptions to his categories in a different way. To achieve the kind of 
density Strauss favors, he narrows the scope of applicable coding families and deepens the tenacity and 
meticulousness with which the researcher searches for exceptions. Strauss argues for the importance of 
what he calls a “coding paradigm” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 27). His insistence on using specific kinds of 
codes is so strong that he maintains “without the inclusion of the paradigm items, coding is not actually 
coding” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 28).  
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Strauss’s coding paradigm adapts the “6 Cs” coding family (causes, contexts, contingencies, 
consequences, covariances, and conditions) (Glaser, 1978, pp. 74) and the “strategies” coding family 
(Glaser, 1978, pp. 76) into a single unit composed of: causal conditions, context, intervening 
conditions, action/interaction strategies, and consequences (Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990; 
Urquhart, 2013). Despite this apparent simplification, Strauss’s coding paradigm tend to densify the 
analysis. According to Glaser, “density is the amount of properties of a category” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 
71). Focusing in on five types of codes forces the analyst to attend to socioculturally dense “‘further 
away’ (or, as some social scientists say, macroscopic or structural)” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 78, brackets in 
original) aspects of the data that are otherwise easy to ignore. To apply Strauss’s coding paradigm, in 
what he calls ‘axial coding’ the analyst conducts “intense analysis done around one category at a time, 
in terms of the paradigm items” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 32). For each category, Straussian grounded theory 
explores the conditions in which it exists, the consequences which might have stayed silent, and, 
ultimately, its granular properties and exceptions. For Glaser, this forcing around only two coding 
families leads to Strauss’s problematic “fantasmagora of rules and dictums” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 86) 
producing a “tyranny of endless questions” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 54) and “hundreds of conceptual 
labels…[without] knowing which are relevant” (Glaser, 1992, pp. 42). We suggest an alternative 
reading: the coding families Strauss prefers are useful for producing a different but equally valid type 
of theory.  
While grounded theory analysis for Glaser is an almost completely inductive process, for 
Strauss it is more complicated. Rather than trusting purely in emergence and induction, Strauss’s 
version of analysis requires that “induction, deduction, and verification…enter into inquiry” (Strauss, 
1987, pp. 12). While Glaser talks almost universally about the ‘joy’ and the ‘high’ of discovering a core 
category, Strauss qualifies that joy with attention to the “constraints and challenges of the research 
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settings” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 7) when analysing grounded theory’s “‘discovered’ (created) concepts” 
(Strauss, 1987, pp. 17, brackets in original). These qualifying statements, and the notion of ‘created’ 
categories, expose the gap between the method’s two founders’ understandings of the analytic process.  
A Straussian analyst must temper the discovery of a category with questions that destabilize the 
category, deliberately seek out exceptions, and lead to conceptually equal but unheard or silenced areas 
of the data. The emergence of a core category indicates “parsimonious” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 71) 
completion of the generative stages of the research for Glaser. For Strauss, the naming of a category 
initiates a series of important downstream interrogations, or what he calls “generative questions” 
(Strauss, 1987, pp. 22). In Glaserian analysis, the next stage of the research process would begin 
identifying the properties of the category by comparing it to other categories and concepts. Strauss 
presses further. He suggests that exceptions to categories identified deductively “‘in imagination’ or 
through experiential data” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 16) should be explored by “dimensionalizing” (Strauss, 
1987, pp. 21) by asking what different exceptions might exist. The coding paradigm introduces a 
fundamental change to the way data should be collected and analyzed. Rather than allowing the codes 
and their exceptions to passively emerge from the data, Strauss understands the coding process as a 
way of “forc[ing] [the researcher] into confronting” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 25) concepts ‘in imagination’ or 
those implicit in the data through “microanalysis” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, pp. 46). 
 These questions probe into areas that participants in the setting may not mention are important 
to them but that the researcher must find to achieve the level of conceptual density Strauss desires. 
Techniques such as the “flip flop” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008, pp. 79) or the “far out” comparison 
(Strauss, 1987, pp. 57), which Glaser vehemently criticizes (Glaser, 1992), are methods of creating 
categories during the coding process that are not explicitly in the data at hand. This ‘category creation’ 
forces the analyst to consider cases that the present categories suggest should be in the data but have 
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not been observed and to bring them into the theory through what Strauss calls verification (Strauss, 
1987).  Dense theory works to capture complexity of social phenomena by forcing the researcher to ask 
questions of the data that the researcher may not have immediately considered, or, as Glaser would say, 
that may not have emerged from the data. 
Charmazian Coding 
Charmaz makes two methodological choices that distinguish her version of grounded theory 
from Glaser’s and Strauss’s. Her first choice is to amplify the importance of gerund-based process 
coding, and her second is to de-emphasize the importance of single core categories. Charmaz does not 
highlight explicitly for the reader how these changes affect the place of description and accounting for 
exceptions in her methodological approach, but we are arguing here that these two facets of grounded 
theory are where her changes have the most dramatic downstream effect. Charmaz’s use of gerunds—
nouns that refer to an active state—focuses her coding within the process coding family, and provides 
her theoretical products with a sense of continual social, behavioral, and psychosocial action. Both 
Glaser and Strauss state that capturing processes is a goal of grounded theory and imply that gerunds 
and the sense of action they convey during coding is a useful way of performing coding. But they do 
not state that it is a primary method of coding (Glaser, 1992). Charmaz does. For Charmaz, codes begin 
with gerunds.  
Relying primarily on gerunds for coding has a dramatic effect on what is included during the 
coding process. Coding balances abstraction and description (Strauss, 1987). For instance, Strauss 
would code a section of an interview where an aggrieved nurse describes leaving a patient’s room 
because he is yelling as “professional composure” rather than “expressing grief” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 29-
30). For Strauss using the latter gerund-based code would be to “remain totally or mostly at a 
descriptive level” (Strauss, 1987, pp. 29). Indeed, there is a fundamental difference between these 
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codes. Professional composure is both a noun and a sociological concept, and, more importantly, it 
does not attend to the complex interplay between researcher and researched. By choosing to code using 
gerunds, Charmaz turns an exercise in categorization into an interpretation of social performance.  
Charmaz’s choice to code using gerunds positions her to “define implicit meaning and actions” 
in the social performances of everyday life (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 124). Gerunds imply that any utterance 
or behavior is part of a larger web of “assumptions, implicit meanings, and tacit rules” (Charmaz, 2014, 
pp. 95) because gerunds do work. When the nurse in this example states in the interview that she is 
aggrieved, rather than coding immediately at the conceptual level (such as ‘professional composure’) 
the Charmazian grounded theorist choses a code that inherently implies that the interviewee is doing 
work on the interviewer. The verb ‘expressing’ does not assume that the interviewee is aggrieved in an 
uncomplicated way. Instead, it assumes that the interviewee’s story and the way it was told, either 
deliberately or in “unspoken and taken for granted” ways (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 99), meant to convey 
some meaning to the researcher or, in a way, to perform a story (McCreaddie & Payne, 2010).  
Relying on gerund-based coding, then, has major implications for Charmazian grounded theory. 
Gerunds move theory toward description. Gerund-based coding “sticks closely to the data” (Charmaz, 
2014, pp. 112), describing what is occurring. Gerunds turn the eye of theory toward performativity and 
insist on the relevance of culture to behaviour, identity, and interaction. If every utterance is doing 
social work, then our most basic form of data is constructed at the social level. It remains impossible to 
strip away the performative aspect of social life, to capture a research participants’ ‘true’ or ‘authentic’ 
self with all its many exceptions; instead, the Charmazian grounded theorist is left with carefully 
describing the kinds of stories people tell us and identifying the links between then. By attempting to 
faithfully collate and descriptively represent the voice of participants, “coding [in Charmazian 
grounded theory] should inspire us to examine hidden assumptions in our use of language as well as 
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that of our participants” (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 114-115, emphasis in original). For Charmaz (2006), 
“research and writing are inherently ideological activities” (pp. 163). Coding using gerunds emphasises 
the implicit social work performed by these ideologies for both researcher and researched.  
A second feature of Charmazian grounded theory distinguishes her methodologically from 
Glaser and Strauss. Charmaz’s de-emphasizing the importance of the single core category 
fundamentally changes the meaning of the ‘basic social process’ in Charmazian grounded theory. 
Glaser’s and Strauss’s approach to abstract basic social process requires that they track exceptions to 
the process and its categories to retain the impression of rigorous trustworthiness, to “make the data 
objective” (Glaser, 2002, pp. 4), and to use microscopic discussions of exceptions to help their 
categories transcend the complexity of the substantive area in which it was created.  Admittedly, 
Charmaz chooses to use a single core category, ‘living one day at a time,’ in her seminal monograph 
(Charmaz, 1991). However, she also deliberately degrades the utility and necessity of the core 
categories. Her core category is not sociological: it does not come from the list of theoretical codes that 
either Glaser or Strauss present as sociological concepts at a sufficient level of abstraction (Glaser, 
1978; Strauss, 1987). Charmaz states that she had trouble finding the core category, and that ultimately 
she felt “collapsing multiple different processes into one [category] would be over-simplifying” 
(Charmaz, 2014, pp. 247). Charmaz’s approach to grounded theory remains a “realist” project about 
finding basic social processes (Charmaz, 2003, pp. 271), but for Glaser and Strauss, finding single core 
categories was how one discovered basic social processes. The two phrases were synonymous. 
Charmaz’s understanding of basic social process is different. For her, a basic social process can be 
descriptive narrative form in which her argument, her “interpretive rendering” (Charmaz, 2014, pp. 
276) of the world, sits (Charmaz, 1991).  




































































 Clarke’s approach to basic social processes and their exceptions follows the same descriptive 
tendency Strauss and Charmaz espoused in earlier decades. Clarke extends their focus by using 
descriptions of difference as the cornerstone of her methodological approach. Clarkeian grounded 
theory is primarily a “supplemental” (Clarke, 2005, pp. xxxvii) method of analyzing previously created 
codes. But because in Clarkeian grounded theory, as in all grounded theory, coding informs subsequent 
stages of data collection it cannot be considered only as a method of post-hoc analysis. Clarke states 
that coding in situational analysis is done in the ‘traditional’ grounded theory method, primarily basing 
her citation on Straussian grounded theory (Clarke, 2005). Clarke takes these codes, adds a second type 
of initial coding family—the “frames” or "sociocultural discourses" coding family (Urquhart, 2013, pp. 
27)—and subjects them to a sophisticated and rigorous level of secondary analysis.  
Exceptions to a category are not only assumed in Clarkiean grounded theory but are basic to the 
approach itself. According to Clarke, she moves away from “Western scientific universalizing master 
narratives ‘explaining variation’ [and moves toward] creating representations that basically assume 
differences and multiplicities and to seek to explicitly map and represent them” (Clarke, 2005, pp. 19). 
In Clarkeian grounded theory, the pursuit of difference comes from an analysis of codes in service to 
three types of maps: situational maps, social worlds/arenas maps, and positional maps. Each of these 
maps constitute one of the missions of Clarke’s reformed understanding of the purpose of theory: the 
description of difference and hidden work. A single and central area of commonality underlies all three. 
Where Charmaz forgoes attempts to account for properties and exceptions to her categories, Clarke 
relies exactly on the presence of exceptions to create her representations of a situation. For Clarke, 
identifying a few properties of the context which might influence the participants’ behaviours in the 
situation is ineffectual: “The conditions of the situation are in the situation. There is no such thing as 
context” (Clarke, 2005, p. 71, emphasis in original). Therefore, rather than using a depiction of a single 
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behavior or two to explain how a problem is encountered, Clarke focuses explicitly on identifying as 
many sources of difference as possible. 
Clarke’s maps enact her broader methodological strategy. The first maps, situational maps, are 
“strategies for articulating the elements in the situation and examining relationships between them” 
(Clarke, 2005, p. 86). Situational maps identify and chart the most important human, nonhuman, 
discursive, and symbolic elements of a situation (Clarke, 2005). The situational maps are, in essence, 
descriptive. They are a product of a reframed analytic ‘forcing’ that pushes the analyst toward looking 
for the unseen elements of the situation. While Strauss also used spatially-oriented techniques for 
identifying elements of the theory that lay outside the initial impressions of the researcher (Strauss, 
1987), his efforts were devoted to finding potentially unseen behaviors or forms of work to be brought 
directly into the core category. Clarke, on the other hand, uses coding and situational map-making for 
diversification. Finding the nonhuman, discursive, and symbolic elements of a situation is an attempt to 
broadly describe what is going on in the situation and to force the researcher to look outside the 
immediate and the singularly human elements in it.  
The second two maps, social worlds/arenas and positional maps, both hold an interpretive 
assumption about social processes at their core. Producing these maps inherently requires that the 
analyst break from reiterating social power structures. The analyst must focus on stripping the positions 
in a debate from the people who hold them. By focusing only on describing the positions themselves, 
and removing questions of hierarchy and the implied value of the positions, positional mapping uses 
description to create room for the interpretation of traditional power structures. For Glaser, “descriptive 
sociology may contribute to myth-breaking, to expose and to help the unknowledgable to know and 
understand a little, but it helps people in the know very little” (Glaser, 1978, pp. 13). Yet it is exactly 
this kind of myth-breaking that Clarke seeks to achieve. Social worlds/arenas are “cartographies of 
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collective commitments, relations, and sites of action” (Clarke, 2005, p 86). They are based on the 
symbolic interactionist notion that ‘the social’ cannot be authentically considered in aggregate but 
should instead consider in smaller, more particular, and more situated units (Clarke, 2005). Similarly, 
positional maps are “simplification strategies for plotting positions articulated and not articulated” (p. 
86). Positional maps are a new strategy on an old problem: how can we make potentially valid but 
silenced positions heard? Positional mapping identifies the relevant major positions taken by actors as 
articulated in the data on their own terms (Clarke, 2005, pp. 126). Clarke suggests that without this 
explicit attention to difference, grounded theories from other schools hide power from public view.  
Summary 
We have attempted to show how a move toward description-as-theory resulted in changing 
attitudes toward exceptions to categories in grounded theory. This move tacitly used description as a 
tool to change the focus of grounded theory from primarily behavioural and abstract to primarily 
sociocultural and situated.  
FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
A grounded theorist’s interpretation of the purpose of theory shapes the methodological choices 
he or she makes. Writing for an audience that expects single basic social processes with easy-to-follow 
and parsimonious theoretical structure requires different methodological tools than writing for an 
audience that expects complex socioculturally and historically-detailed representations of a situation. 
So contemporary grounded theory finds itself in a double bind. If the goal of Glaserian and Straussian 
grounded theory is only formal theory—preferably a few words strung together—to describe what all 
people in a certain situation do, think, and feel, then it is reasonable to suggest that grounded theory is 
an inherently modernist project—an expert consolidating the experience and viewpoint of a generalized 
other. In this case, “formal theories exacerbate the tension between our need to create rules of thumb to 
get things done and our postmodern awareness that the complexity of life can never fully be captured in 
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any theory” (Kearney, 2007, pp. 128). But it is just as reasonable to suggest that grounded theory’s 
focus across all four schools on the interpretation of the researcher turns the grounded theorist into a 
weaver of narratives. Someone who splices and dices their story about a process with the experiences 
and viewpoints of others. Across all four schools, grounded theory presents researchers with strategies 
to make bridges across gulfs of experience: bridges from those who have experience in a given 
situation to those who don’t, and bridges from those who have experience in the situation to their prior 
selves before they were changed by it.  
The authors of each of the four schools found themselves bound to write about methodology 
within the epistemological constraints of their disciplines and their sociocultural context. We hope that 
taking a precise account of four schools of grounded theory and the methodological choices privileged 
by each will allow grounded theorists to find more clarity about what kind of theory they aim to 
produce and how to get there. Understanding not only how the schools differ but also their fundamental 
similarities gives grounded theorists more opportunity to dip into the waters of each and to reconcile 
epistemological differences that once appeared irreconcilable. 
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